‘SRF unable to overthrow Sudan regime militarily’: survey

The rebel Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) is unlikely to achieve its objective to overthrow the Khartoum regime if it cannot ally itself with parties of Sudan’s political opposition and secure new streams of foreign military support, researchers of the Small Arms Survey said. They also found that the allied rebel movements differ over military tactics against the Sudanese army. The working paper ‘The Sudan Revolutionary Front: Its formation and development’, published this month, examines the alliance’s major military and political campaigns. The Small Arms Survey (SAS), an independent research project of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, based its research on interviews with SRF leaders, officials of the ruling National Congress Party, diplomats, and security sources. The report found that “militarily, the alliance has demonstrated its prowess”. On 11 November 2011, Sudan’s major rebel movements, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) led by Malik Agar, the Sudan Liberation Army led by Abdel Wahid El Nur (SLA-AW), the SLA faction led by Minni Minawi (SLA-MM), and Jibril Ibrahim’s Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) signed an alliance with the objective of working together to remove President Omar Al Bashir with either political or military pressure. On paper, their alliance was the combination of the greatest internal military threats to Al Bashir.Fighting styleThe researchers mention the attack on Um Rawaba in North Kordofan in April 2013 as the SRF’s greatest success, when they also took Abu Kershola and retained control there for a month. The operation, however, revealed several of SRF’s weaknesses and military tensions in the alliance. It was unable to hold major towns because of Sudan’s air superiority. Also, according to the survey, the members seriously differ over their military tactics: the Darfurians’ fast-moving hit-and-run tactics and the SPLM-N’s focus on taking and holding territory. In an interview with the SAS, JEM leader Jibril Ibrahim says that their fighting usually lasts ten or fifteen minutes. “The main thing in our style of war is fire power. You use as much fire power as you can to cover yourself. We use more ammunition than the SPLM-N does.” The SPLM-N, the author states, is more of a conventional army. It has been able to capture significant quantities of weapons in battle, and it controls large amounts of territory in South Kordofan and Blue Nile. Political alliances The SRF did not attempt a major combined offensive in the year after Abu Kershola. This could indicate that the SRF is not increasing in numbers or access to materiel, the author writes. The alliance does not appear to have the capacity to overthrow the government militarily and therefore requires an alliance with Sudan’s unarmed opposition. The most recent attempt to build bridges with the opposition, was the signing of the Paris Declaration with El Sadig El Mahdi’s National Umma Party in August this year. The author stresses that political parties are under intense pressure from the government not to sign a pact with the rebels. The government has claimed that the SRF received support from neighbouring countries since its creation. The SAS has seen no evidence of South Sudan’s army supplying weapons and ammunition to the SRF, “although the South Sudanese army has likely provided logistical and other support”. “Fundamentally, unless the rebels can secure new streams of foreign support, they are unlikely to come much closer to their stated objective to overthrow Al Bashir’s regime militarily. Only a combination of SRF military gains, domestic political pressure, and an uprising in the centre is likely to achieve regime change… But the SRF’s integration with the unarmed political opposition remains a work in progress,” the report concludes.The eastern Sudanese Beja Congress joined the SRF in November 2011. The United Popular Front (UPF), a coalition of eastern Sudanese factions, officially joined in October 2013. File photo: The leaders of the SRF, from left to right: Abdel Wahid El Nur (SLM-AW), Jibril Ibrahim (JEM), Minni Minawi (SLM-MM), and Malik Agar (SPLM-N) (archive) Related: Sudan’s regime rejects Paris Declaration; Umma Party responds (20 August 2014) Darfur rebels attack military base, Sudan’s army calls for dialogue (13 August 2014) Sudan rebels ‘destroy’ convoy in Kordofan – threats from Khartoum (13 May 2013) Sudan party leader joins rebels and signs New Dawn charter (31 January 2013)

The rebel Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) is unlikely to achieve its objective to overthrow the Khartoum regime if it cannot ally itself with parties of Sudan’s political opposition and secure new streams of foreign military support, researchers of the Small Arms Survey said. They also found that the allied rebel movements differ over military tactics against the Sudanese army.

The working paper ‘The Sudan Revolutionary Front: Its formation and development’, published this month, examines the alliance’s major military and political campaigns. The Small Arms Survey (SAS), an independent research project of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, based its research on interviews with SRF leaders, officials of the ruling National Congress Party, diplomats, and security sources.

The report found that “militarily, the alliance has demonstrated its prowess”. On 11 November 2011, Sudan’s major rebel movements, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) led by Malik Agar, the Sudan Liberation Army led by Abdel Wahid El Nur (SLA-AW), the SLA faction led by Minni Minawi (SLA-MM), and Jibril Ibrahim’s Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) signed an alliance with the objective of working together to remove President Omar Al Bashir with either political or military pressure. On paper, their alliance was the combination of the greatest internal military threats to Al Bashir.

Fighting style

The researchers mention the attack on Um Rawaba in North Kordofan in April 2013 as the SRF’s greatest success, when they also took Abu Kershola and retained control there for a month. The operation, however, revealed several of SRF’s weaknesses and military tensions in the alliance. It was unable to hold major towns because of Sudan’s air superiority. Also, according to the survey, the members seriously differ over their military tactics: the Darfurians’ fast-moving hit-and-run tactics and the SPLM-N’s focus on taking and holding territory.

In an interview with the SAS, JEM leader Jibril Ibrahim says that their fighting usually lasts ten or fifteen minutes. “The main thing in our style of war is fire power. You use as much fire power as you can to cover yourself. We use more ammunition than the SPLM-N does.” The SPLM-N, the author states, is more of a conventional army. It has been able to capture significant quantities of weapons in battle, and it controls large amounts of territory in South Kordofan and Blue Nile.

Political alliances

The SRF did not attempt a major combined offensive in the year after Abu Kershola. This could indicate that the SRF is not increasing in numbers or access to materiel, the author writes. The alliance does not appear to have the capacity to overthrow the government militarily and therefore requires an alliance with Sudan’s unarmed opposition. The most recent attempt to build bridges with the opposition, was the signing of the Paris Declaration with El Sadig El Mahdi’s National Umma Party in August this year. The author stresses that political parties are under intense pressure from the government not to sign a pact with the rebels.

The government has claimed that the SRF received support from neighbouring countries since its creation. The SAS has seen no evidence of South Sudan’s army supplying weapons and ammunition to the SRF, “although the South Sudanese army has likely provided logistical and other support”.

“Fundamentally, unless the rebels can secure new streams of foreign support, they are unlikely to come much closer to their stated objective to overthrow Al Bashir’s regime militarily. Only a combination of SRF military gains, domestic political pressure, and an uprising in the centre is likely to achieve regime change… But the SRF’s integration with the unarmed political opposition remains a work in progress,” the report concludes.

The eastern Sudanese Beja Congress joined the SRF in November 2011. The United Popular Front (UPF), a coalition of eastern Sudanese factions, officially joined in October 2013.

File photo: The leaders of the SRF, from left to right: Abdel Wahid El Nur (SLM-AW), Jibril Ibrahim (JEM), Minni Minawi (SLM-MM), and Malik Agar (SPLM-N) (archive)

Related:

Sudan’s regime rejects Paris Declaration; Umma Party responds (20 August 2014)

Darfur rebels attack military base, Sudan’s army calls for dialogue (13 August 2014)

Sudan rebels ‘destroy’ convoy in Kordofan – threats from Khartoum (13 May 2013)

Sudan party leader joins rebels and signs New Dawn charter (31 January 2013)

Welcome

Install
×