Polemics and new initiatives continue to characterise Sudan political scene

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While the signatories of the Framework Agreement are preparing their second dialogue conference, on (transitional) justice, views on the reform of the military or power structures are being aired. Eastern Sudanese groups announced the establishment of a platform to discuss the future of the region separately. Egypt will continue to organise a Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue in Cairo “in the coming period”.

On December 5, more than 40 political parties, movements, and professional groups signed the Framework Agreement with the military junta in Khartoum under auspices of the AU-IGAD-UN Trilateral Mechanism. The text was drafted by the Forces for Freedom and Change-Central Council (FFC-CC) and was amended after comments from the military.

It was decided in November that an agreement with the military to hand over power to a new government of technocrats would be signed in two stages. Five important but thorny issues would be discussed later and incorporated in a final agreement: the removal of the consequences of the empowerment* politics of dictator Omar Al Bashir (1989-2019), justice and transitional justice, reform of military and security institutions, possible amendments to the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement, and governance in eastern Sudan.

The first of the five conferences planned to be held this month, on empowerment removal mechanisms, ended on Thursday. The outcomes will be included in the draft Final Agreement, to be agreed upon by the ruling junta.

The displaced in Darfur have called the dialogue workshops held in Khartoum “elitist”.

Allies

In a press statement two days ago, the New Democratic Forces Movement, Hag, said that it will sign the Framework Agreement and join the current dialogue process.

The Nasserite Democratic Unionist Party announced that it has decided to continue its membership of the FFC-CC alliance.

The FFC-CC welcomed the decisions, and said in a statement yesterday that “the current political process is one of the integrated means incorporated in the political vision of the alliance to end the coup”.

Reform of the military

During his visit to the Blue Nile region on Sunday, Lt Gen Abdelfattah El Burhan Commander of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), President of the Sovereignty Council, and leader of the October 2021 coup d’état, warned politicians against interfering in the army’s affairs. “No one forces us to do anything, no embassy or else. Everything we do is in the interest of the country.”

Adil Khalafallah, spokesperson for the Socialist Arab Ba’ath Party, told Radio Dabanga that “El Burhan’s statements contradict earlier statements and imply that he is not interested in democratic transition and refuses to leave politics”.

Political scientist Salah El Doma also commented “that this is not the first time that El Burhan reneges on his pledges”.

The army commander “signed the Framework Agreement with the same parties he now accuses of interfering in army affairs,” El Doma said. “We have grown accustomed to El Burhan contradicting himself.”

The Saudi Al Sharq TV reported yesterday that the Sudanese Army Command in a meeting few days ago, recommended that the Sudanese army itself must be responsible for reforming the military and security system.

Military sources reportedly said that the Army Command proposed the formation of military, intelligence, and police committees tasked with defining the reform process.

The Framework Agreement stipulates full civilian authority at all levels, and a Security and Defence Council headed by the Prime Minister. It speaks about “one national professional army” that is to protect the nation’s borders and defend “democratic civilian rule”.

Power structures

On Saturday, a workshop on transitional power structures organised by the El Gezira Forum for Democratic Civilian Dialogue in cooperation with the University of Khartoum Lecturers Initiative was held in Wad Madani, capital of El Gezira.

Its participants spoke about the importance of clearly formulated criteria for the power structures during the upcoming transitional period, and the establishment of a Transitional Legislative Council “in a balanced way that does justice to the 18 states of the country”.

Eastern Sudan platform

In eastern Sudan, the Red Sea state Coordination of Political Parties, Civil Society Organisations, and Demanding Bodies, announced the establishment of a separate platform to address the governance of eastern Sudan.

A general conference will be held on “the issues of eastern Sudan, within the framework of a unified Sudan,” the new alliance said in a press statement on Monday.

In the statement, the National Umma Party, the Hag Movement, and a number of other groups, declared their rejection of “the tutelage approach by Khartoum”, and stated that “addressing the problems of eastern Sudan is a duty that should be dealt with by the real stakeholders”.

The resources in Red Sea state “are to be exploited in such a way that this leads to the economic well-being of the state’s residents,” the statement said. “The laws and regulations of all revenue institutions in the Red Sea state, including the Sea Ports Corporation and mining companies in Ariab and other places, must be reviewed to ensure a fair distribution of revenues.”

Contrary with what is happening now, residents of Red Sea state should be able to enjoy positive discrimination in education and job opportunities, “which leads to sustainable development of human and material resources”.

The High Council of Beja Nazirs and Independent Chieftains faction headed by Hadendowa Nazir Sayed Tirik as well demands a separate platform where the future of eastern Sudan should be discussed.

Taha Faki, the council’s secretary general, said in a statement yesterday that they will “close the east if the Framework Agreement forces continue to insist on discussing eastern Sudan in a conference in Khartoum”.

“Holding workshops in isolation from real stakeholders is a challenge we reject, as we experienced many times before that the implementation of the ideas from Khartoum exacerbate the crisis in eastern Sudan,” he stated, and renewed the Council’s call to allocate “a negotiating platform that does not exclude anyone”.

Supporters of the Beja Nazirs Council repeatedly closed the Red Sea posts and the Khartoum-Port Sudan highway in the past two years to lend force to their demands for a separate platform.

Egyptian initiative

Two weeks ago, Egypt proposed a new inter-Sudanese dialogue platform to be held in Cairo for the parties that signed and abstained from signing the Framework Agreement.

The signatories of the agreement rejected the Egyptian initiative because the dialogue process on the remaining five issues “cannot be changed at the last moment”.

On Sunday, Hossam Abdelghaffar, the official spokesperson for the Egyptian Council of Ministers, denied rumours about the suspension of the initiative.

Hossam said in a press conference on the side-lines of the Egyptian-Saudi strategic dialogue on Sunday that Cairo is “continuing its unremitting efforts to bridge the views of the political forces in Sudan, by holding a Sudanese-Sudanese workshop in Cairo during the coming period”.

* Empowerment (tamkin) is the term with which the ousted Al Bashir government supported its affiliates by granting them far-going privileges, including government functions, the setting-up of various companies, and tax exemptions. In the end of 2019, the government of Abdallah Hamdok established the Committee for Dismantling the June 30 1989 Regime, Removal of Empowerment and Corruption, and Recovering Public Funds with the aim to purge the country of the remnants of the former regime. The work of the Empowerment Removal Committee (ERC) was suspended, and a number of its members detained following the October 2021 military coup.