El Burhan’s China visit secures major deals amid Sudan gov isolation

Commander-in-chief of the Sudanese Armed Forces, Lt Gen Abdelfattah El Burhan, arrived in Beijing yesterday for the 2024 Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which runs till Friday. During his visit, El Burhan oversaw the signing of several crucial agreements. These deals cover a wide range of sectors, including solar energy, mining, agriculture, and transmission lines, as well as joint agreements in nuclear energy, and the development of airports and ports.

The signing took place in the presence of a high-level diplomatic delegation from Sudan, which included top engineering and government officials. This group played a key role in facilitating the agreements with Chinese counterparts. The agreements also included partnerships with the Jiad Engineering Group and several Chinese companies in the automotive industry.

In a post earlier today on X (formerly Twitter), the Sovereignty Council reported that El Burhan held successful meetings with executives from various Chinese companies involved in oil, solar energy, electricity, and infrastructure development. These discussions paved the way for the broad spectrum of agreements signed today, signalling Sudan’s intent to enhance cooperation with China across multiple sectors.

Legitimacy

Radio Dabanga interviewed former diplomat El Sadig El Maqli for his perspective on El Burhan’s participation in the summit. El Maqli noted that Sudan remains under significant international isolation.

The African Union has suspended Sudan’s membership, while the European Union and the Sudan Troika memebers (Norway, UK, and the US), do not recognise the government in Port Sudan. Despite this, they still engage with Sudan based on the principle of dealing with a de facto government.

El Maqli suggested that the Port Sudan government is keen to gain legitimacy. Events like this summit offer a rare opportunity to assert its status on the global stage, particularly with China, a nation that regularly hosts summits with African Union members.

Reflecting on Sudan’s invitation to Russia, El Maqli emphasised that the Port Sudan government eagerly responded to China’s invitation, viewing it as a chance to bolster what he called the “legitimacy of the de facto.”

However, he pointed out a notable absence at the summit: Sudanese business leaders. Unlike other African countries, which included representatives from their business sectors, Sudan’s delegation consisted mainly of government ministers. This absence underscores the challenges facing Sudan’s international engagement.

Investment returns

El Maqli expressed doubt about the practical benefits of these agreements. “Under the current security situation in Sudan, it’s unlikely that these deals with China will lead to real investments,” he stated. Even under normal circumstances, he noted, bilateral relations only yield significant returns when the domestic situation is stable.

He also dismissed the possibility of China playing a mediating role in Sudan’s conflict, citing China’s focus on trade and investment, rather than conflict resolution. He contrasted this with Russia’s use of private military contractors, like the Wagner Group, to secure its interests in Africa.

Arms deals

On the topic of arms purchases, El Maqli suggested that Sudan could still acquire military equipment from China, despite the controversial nature of such transactions. He acknowledged that exceptions, like the UN arms embargo on Darfur, could pose challenges, but these would not completely block the possibility.

El Maqli doubted that Sudan-China relations would significantly improve under the current conditions. He emphasised that even if agreements are signed, they are unlikely to translate into real investments, given Sudan’s deteriorating investment climate and ongoing conflict.