Arming civilians in Sudan: Chaos of war fuels spread of weapons and deepens divisions

Sudan Media Forum: Joint Editorial Room

Report: Shawky Abdel Azim

The war that broke out on April 15, 2023, revealed a severe lack of training in the two warring armies, the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, which led them to resort to civilians in their conflict. As a result, weapons have proliferated, their trade has worsened, and civilians’ rights have been widely violated, at the hands of individuals unqualified to bear arms.

M.A., 29, from the town of “Umm Dam”, recounts his bitter experience, saying: “The war left a huge chaos in our town. State institutions, such as the local council, the court, and the police station, were its most prominent features. But they evaporated in mid-June 2023. The court suspended its sessions due to the absence of the judge, who preferred safety and disappeared. The mayor left the town, wishing us safety. The police officers, who are from the town, calmly emptied the police station of important files, office supplies, and the light weapons they had in their possession, which were several Kalashnikov rifles and ammunition boxes not exceeding 150 bullets, as A.A., a policeman from the town, told me.”

“In the midst of this chaos, we had to take responsibility for protecting ourselves, our families, and our property. In other words, we had to buy weapons and take responsibility for using them,” he added.

Politics behind the weakness of the two armies

Current and retired Sudanese army officers spoke passionately about the poor training of the two armies, and agreed that it was behind many of the war’s violations, especially after the army used unqualified civilians and armed them in residential areas, which contributed to the spread of weapons.

Retired Major General Kamal Ismail believes that “the Sudanese army’s use of civilians in combat is, in itself, a sign of great weakness.” He points out that “the establishment of the Rapid Support Forces as a parallel army is a logical result of the weakening that the Islamists have caused to the army.”

Other officers who witnessed the 1989 coup led by Omar Al Bashir pointed out that the politicisation of the security sector was a major entry point for weakness and corruption within the security services, especially the army. Colonel Walid Ezz El-Din, who was removed from the army for political reasons, believes that after the 1989 coup, “they worked to Islamise the army, and wanted to transform it into an Islamic jihadist missionary army, and they made a change in the combat doctrine, so that instead of the army protecting the constitution and the homeland, it became protecting the Islamist regime.” As a result, the army was neglected in terms of training, curriculum, and combat doctrine.

The officers point out that the first batch to be accepted into the Military College after the Islamist coup, batch 40, known as “Protectors of Religion,” was accepted through the Islamic organisation. Since then, the Islamic organisation has taken over the reins of the army through the Intelligence Service, says Major General Kamal Ismail.

Many military experts agree that the politicisation of the army by Islamists had negative effects on the army’s professionalism and military readiness. These effects were evident in the April 15 War, led by a number of Islamist officers.

Corruption is eating away at the army and the Rapid Support Forces

Although 80% of the state budget was allocated to security and defence during Omar al-Bashir’s rule, the army entered into many investments, including meat and agricultural product exports, as well as commercial companies competing in the agricultural and industrial sectors. It established the “Military Industrialisation Corporation” in 1993, which was later known as the “Defence Industries System.” The aim of these investments was to improve the army’s position, increase its resources, qualify it, and supply it with advanced weapons, but this did not happen, and these investments were not reflected in the army, and the system and its resources were controlled by senior leaders. The army’s investments then moved to the mining sector.

A Sudanese army officer, who is involved in economic files, said that “the army invests in everything… sometimes investments with countries for the purpose of relations, and many times for profit purposes.” He pointed out that the largest investments are in the gold mining sector with Russian, Emirati and Moroccan companies. Regarding the use of these resources to qualify the army, he said that “the benefit from them is limited and the main reason is corruption.” Cases of corruption in the army are often discussed, but they are difficult to verify due to the security grip, and the army’s investments are not subject to review by the national auditor.

The military’s investments and companies caused a major controversy during the transitional period, when Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok demanded that they be subject to monitoring, saying that “only 18% of revenues enter the treasury.” The military stuck to its investments and companies, rejecting civilian interference.

A lieutenant colonel in the Sudanese army said, “The conditions of the Sudanese soldiers are not good; their salaries are low and do not reach them regularly.” He pointed out that the soldiers’ “missions” of military clothing and supplies were neglected after the “Juba Peace Agreement” in October 2020. Since the pre-revolutionary era, the army’s clothing supplies have been subject to major corruption after being entrusted to the “Sur” factory, a factory owned by Turkish businessman “Oktay Shaban Husni,” who has partnerships with leaders of Omar al-Bashir’s regime.

According to an army source, corruption even extended to the purchase of weapons. “There is a famous deal made by the Minister of Defence, Abdul Rahim Mohammed Hussein, when he bought used tanks from Belarus as new ones, and the army was unable to use them,” he added. The phenomenon of “fake lists” has also spread among the army, which are payrolls with the names of soldiers who are not in service, some of whom are dead.

The source said, “Low salaries and poor training have caused a large number of soldiers to drop out, and have also led to Sudanese youth being reluctant to join the army.” He continued, “The average age of soldiers in the army is over 35 years, which is a non-combat age.”

The government also dispensed with large numbers of soldiers after the secession of South Sudan in 2011, which has made it recently rely on the Rapid Support Forces for its combat missions.

“Many Sudanese soldiers had not been paid since the fighting began months ago, leaving their morale low, fighters were not wearing signs to show which side they were on, and friendly fire was a regular threat,” a Ukrainian soldier who fought alongside the army told the Wall Street Journal.

According to a press tour conducted by one of the participants in this investigation, a number of soldiers said that they had not received their salaries regularly since the outbreak of the war, and that there were restrictive procedures that prevented their families from obtaining them easily. One soldier said: “The salaries were stopped in the first months of the war, and in August we started receiving our salaries, then they stopped again and a few months ago we were dismissed.” Most of the soldiers were wearing new military uniforms that they said were distributed to them after the war.

Rapid Support Forces: An Outlaw Financial Institution

The RSF is not based on institutions in the conventional sense, but is run by its commander, Lt. Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as “Hemedti,” his half-brother Abdel Rahim Dagalo, and a number of their family members. Although it has received soldiers’ salaries from the Sudanese government’s treasury since its establishment until before the war, its management is left to the leadership of the RSF.

A brigadier general who had previously joined the Rapid Support Forces said: “There are departments in the Rapid Support Forces, including a financial department that is fully subject to the leadership and determines spending and priorities.” The brigadier general pointed out that the financial department employs retired and active military personnel, but the economic expansion of the Rapid Support Forces came after its participation in the war in Yemen known as “Operation Decisive Storm,” in which it received millions of dollars in exchange for its soldiers participating in the fighting. It disposed of the money away from state oversight and accountability, in addition to its monopoly on gold mining in the Darfur region, especially the Jebel Amer area, until Hemeti came to control the largest “political budget” in Sudan, which is money that can be spent on private security, or any activity, without any accountability. The El Junaid Company, which is run by his relatives, has become a huge group covering investment, mining, construction, transportation, car rental, iron, and steel, and all of this financial empire is outside the scope of state auditing and monitoring.

Several experts have pointed out that the Rapid Support Forces were better equipped than the army at the start of the war in terms of equipment, soldiers’ supplies, vehicles, and light, medium, and heavy weapons. “The Rapid Support Forces are modern forces that are no more than ten years old, so the soldier’s situation in them was better,” said retired Major General Kamal Ismail. The Rapid Support Forces were supported by the UAE and Saudi Arabia before the war with the state’s approval.

Poor soldiers and poor training

According to an army officer, training at the Sudanese Military College was affected during the Salvation years, especially after the peace agreement in 2005. “The change in combat doctrine affected the training and qualification of officers,” said retired Major General Awad al-Karim Gharbawi. “In the past, an officer would receive a course in Britain or Russia; today, he does not go to more than Egypt or Jordan.” He pointed out that the low level of training at the Military College, along with the nature of the military students who were accepted for their political loyalty, affected the efficiency and military discipline of the officers. He said, “A lieutenant from the Islamist organisation can command a major who is not from the organisation.” All of this was reflected in the training of soldiers.

Our survey of soldiers in Gedaref revealed that more than 85% of them had no more than primary education, and most of them said that they had enlisted in the army because they had no job options, and most of them were from poor or very poor classes.

A 31-year-old soldier reported that he had been trained in the Jebeit camp in eastern Sudan, and that the training period was 3 continuous months, after which he was sent to Gedaref. The training was limited to the use of Kalashnikov, G3 and Goryunov rifles. Regarding receiving teaching materials related to human rights concepts, he denied this.

Fighting alongside the army are armed movements, which rebelled against Al-Bashir’s regime, most of which are Darfur movements, most notably the Sudan Liberation Movement, the Justice and Equality Movement, and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North, Malik Agar’s wing in Blue Nile. The formations of these forces go back more than twenty years, and they were originally formed on a tribal and ethnic basis. They are only trained in the use of weapons, and there is no specific curriculum for ranks, promotions, or training in the ethics and principles of combat.

Trained and untrained soldiers

“Some of the forces fighting in the current battle have received military training, while others have not,” said a former RSF soldier. He noted that the RSF had received intensive training as infantry and rapid intervention forces in camps in Khartoum since 2007 in Hattab, east of the Nile (30 kilometres northeast of Khartoum Bahri), in El Salha (17 kilometres south of Omdurman), and in Bahri.

The soldier, whose name we are withholding because he is in dangerous areas, explained that they were trained by Sudanese army officers, and when they participated in the war in Yemen, they received training in camps in Darfur, including a camp in the El Zuruk area (87 kilometres north of El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur State). He said: “The training was difficult, and even after training, the soldier would stay in the camp and would not leave except to go to Yemen, or be assigned to guard posts.” However, he added: “Today, after the outbreak of the war, there are untrained soldiers in the ranks of the Rapid Support Forces who fight with tribal enthusiasm.”

In the same vein, a Rapid Support officer revealed that Rapid Support soldiers received intensive training in camps in Yemen, the UAE, and Eritrean territory during their participation in Operation Decisive Storm. According to two sources, Abu Dhabi established camps to mobilise and recruit Sudanese within the Rapid Support Forces in the UAE and on the Eritrean island of Assab. He suggested that this training was supported by the UAE, and pointed out that some of the soldiers who trained and participated in the Yemen war left the Rapid Support Forces, but most of them returned to fight with this war.

Among the fighters in the ranks of the Rapid Support Forces are soldiers who have not received military training in the usual sense, but are only skilled in the use of light weapons. A soldier said: “There are some Rapid Support soldiers who have never been to a training camp, they only know how to use weapons.” He pointed out that most of the groups they call “Umm Baqa” have not received training, and some of the soldiers who come are part of the “fazaa” – a tribal mobilisation – alongside tribal militias established to protect tribes and regions.

18 days’ training

Among the groups participating in the ongoing war are the Islamic jihadist battalions, such as the “El Baraa bin Malik” Battalion, the “El Bunyan El Marsous” Battalion, and the “El Furqan” Battalion. These have been trained by Islamist groups in Sudan for a long time, and the training is always kept secret. There is also the Operations Authority forces, which were affiliated with the Security and Intelligence Service and were dissolved following the force’s rebellion during the transitional period. However, their members returned to work under the army’s command, in what is known as the “Special Action Forces.” These have received high-level combat training, and most of them belong to the Islamists and support the rule of Omar al-Bashir.

Fighting alongside the army are a group of civilians known as “the mobilised” or “the armed popular resistance.” They joined the fighting after the call of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, in the third month of the war. One of the mobilised said that he received limited training before being sent to battle in the El Faw area (95 kilometres east of Wad Madani). He said: “I trained for 18 days, then moved to the El Faw area.” He pointed out that he trained in a camp with a group that preceded him by ten days, indicating that there are citizens from the Nile River whose sons joined the popular resistance and received quick training that did not exceed a month. They participated in the fighting and in protecting the bases, which caused them great risks when using weapons, and injuries often occurred among them.

Arming civilians…the army deepens the crisis

The army has traditionally armed civilians and used them against armed movements rebelling against the central authority in Khartoum, but it expanded its arming of civilians significantly after the war that broke out on April 15, 2023 between it and the Rapid Support Forces. The army’s resort to this strategy this time coincided with accusations that Islamists were igniting the war to disrupt the civilian transition, which led to chaos, widespread proliferation of weapons, and deepening divisions in Sudanese society.

Sources revealed that the Islamist battalions participated in the war since its first months, and their first appearance was in the Central Reserve Camp in Khartoum, then in the battles of the El Shajara military area. The Islamic movement officially mourned some of its youth who participated in the battle. The source said that the Islamist organisation within the security apparatus, military intelligence, and popular security took over the mobilisation for popular resistance.

A number of civilians, mostly young men, joined the army, where they were armed to protect their areas, but also participated in the fighting. The monitoring and arming are carried out by former leaders of the Islamic Movement and the State before the fall of the regime on April 11, 2019, including officials in the Popular Defence Forces, a popular force established by the former regime to support the army in the civil war in South Sudan, and later in the rural wars against the rebel movements.

According to army sources, the idea of mobilisation and popular resistance is an Islamist idea. In public speeches, the head of the Sovereignty Council and Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, called on citizens to take up arms and defend themselves or support the army in its war against the Rapid Support Forces.

Supporters of al-Bashir’s regime established what is known as the Popular Support Authority for the Armed Forces, which is concerned with collecting donations for the mobilised, the popular resistance, and supporting soldiers in the field. In a widely circulated video before it was deleted, a preacher close to the Islamic Movement, Abdel Hai Youssef, stated that the popular resistance is an alternative name for “jihad.” He said that the old Islamic mujahideen who participated in the war in South Sudan are the ones training the mobilised civilians and the popular resistance. A source close to the Islamists said that the popular resistance has a political dimension that aims to distance political opponents, mobilise the people, and present them as supporters of the army.

Military camps: an incubator for armed civilians

In the capital, Khartoum, those mobilised in the first weeks of the war obtained weapons from army stores. An officer in the armed forces, who moved to the capital of a neighbouring country after the war, said that the army armed citizens in the Omdurman area and the outlying areas of the city of Bahri with light weapons. He pointed out that the General Intelligence Service and Military Intelligence undertook the task of arming citizens in the capital to protect their areas, and Islamic leaders took on the task of mobilising citizens in residential neighbourhoods.

A number of young civilian Islamists joined the army camps in Wadi Saydna in Omdurman, the engineering corps, and the armoured corps. A number of them took over operating combat drones after receiving training from Ukrainian experts, and re-formed jihadist battalions, including the “El Bara’ bin Malik” and “El Bunyan El Marsous” battalions, and remained in the army camps and were armed within the military units.

Arms Sales in the Markets: Armament Chaos

Northern State residents said that the leaders of the popular resistance armed the citizens by selling them weapons. An eyewitness reported that the leader of the popular resistance, Azhari El Mubarak, brought three trucks loaded with weapons, guarded by army soldiers, and mobilised personnel, and stopped in the middle of the market of the city of El Daba. A Chinese-made Kalashnikov rifle was sold to the citizens for 700,000 Sudanese pounds (about 350 US dollars). The buyer is given a document showing the purchase and the weapon’s number, and is obligated to legalise it after the war ends.

Azhari Mubarak, one of the most famous gold traders and artisanal miners, donated $5 million to support the war effort. One citizen said that “the number of citizens who bought weapons in Dabba exceeded 1,600 citizens.” The commander-in-chief of the army had allowed citizens to obtain weapons by all means to defend themselves.

In the Northern State, there were active campaigns to collect donations for the popular resistance and to establish what is known as the “Chamber of Commerce to Support the Popular Resistance,” which is run by members of the regime of former President Omar Al Bashir, according to citizens in Dabba who accuse it of corruption.

Eastern Sudan: Eritrean Weapon

The army controls the eastern states of Sudan and has been active in arming civilians to defend cities. The Islamist leader Ahmed Haroun, who is wanted by the International Criminal Court, has adopted the mobilisation in eastern Sudan and held meetings with leaders in the eastern states of Sudan in order to arm civilians to engage in the fighting.

A military expert said that arming civilians in eastern Sudan was done on a tribal basis. A number of residents of the region reported that their tribes had limited weapons before the war, but that this had expanded significantly after the war, stressing that members of the former regime in the security services were supervising the arming process in cooperation with the civil administrations and tribal leaders.

In cooperation with Eritrea, the sons of the tribes of eastern Sudan were trained and armed. Major General Omar Nimr, a leader in the National Congress, said in a public speech in Kassala that Eritrea had opened its land to training camps for the sons of eastern Sudan.

An expert on eastern Sudan affairs, who asked to remain anonymous, said that four tribal groups were armed after the war, and a large number of their members were trained in camps inside Eritrean territory.

Consequences of arming civilians:

• Escalating violence: The proliferation of weapons has exacerbated violence and tribal conflicts, threatening security, and stability throughout Sudan.

• Increased division: Arming civilians has deepened social and tribal divisions, and created armed hotbeds that are difficult to control in the future.

• Human rights violations: The proliferation of weapons has contributed to increased human rights violations, including killing, looting, rape, and forced displacement.

• Difficulty of disarmament: Disarming civilians in the post-war period is a major challenge, requiring intensive efforts and national consensus.

The arming of civilians in Sudan has exposed a deep crisis in conflict management, with serious implications for security, stability, and national unity. Addressing this issue requires a comprehensive approach that includes stopping the fighting, addressing the root causes of the conflict, launching an inclusive national dialogue, and implementing an effective disarmament and reintegration programme.

This report is published on the platforms of all media institutions, organisations, and press members of the Sudan Media Forum.

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